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Are fathers and mothers equal parents? Not according to the
Supreme Court. Announcing the recent decision of Miller v.
Albright, the Court declared that while a woman becomes a parent
immediately upon the birth of her child, a man is not legally
considered a parent until he assumes post-birth responsibility for his
child.' Miller challenged a provision of the United States
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which denies U.S. citizenship
to a child who is born abroad and out of wedlock to a citizen father
unless paternity is legally established during the child's minority.2 By
contrast, the statute does not require a mother to undertake any
affirmative acts. Upholding the provision, the Court found its
decision was not based on gender stereotypes.3 Instead, it reasoned
that a statutory disparity was the only means of encouraging fathers
to have relationships with their children.4 Mothers, on the other
* Associate Professor and Immigration Clinic Instructor, Saint Thomas University
School of Law; B.A. 1988, University of Virginia; J.D. 1992, University of Virginia.
1. 523 U.S. 420, 440-43 (1998).
2. Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) § 309(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)
(1940). Because the alleged United States citizen child in Miller was born prior to the
1986 amendments to this provision, paternity could be established by legitimation or a
court adjudication of paternity prior to the child reaching 21. The 1986 amendments
created further disparities by reducing to 18 the age before which a child could be
acknowledged and by demanding an assumption of financial support by a father. Act of
Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657 (codified as amended at INA §
309(a)(3)-(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3)-(4)(1995)). For more on the provision and its
amendments, see infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
3. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 434.
4. See ih at 439.
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hand, needed no such provocation. Indeed, to place similar demands
on mothers would be "superfluous. '5 Miller is a powerful reminder of
the control gender images command. Despite its reassurances, the
effect of Supreme Court's decision was to openly justify a statute
based upon implicit assumptions regarding the inherent nurturing
ability of mothers and the wayward nature of fathers.
In many areas of law, the influence of gender perceptions has
been revealed.6 On occasion, legally confronting such biases has
brought relief. 7 Of course, in many other instances, legal remedies
have been of little use against the power of gender stereotypes. 8 In
immigration law, legal images of gender remain unspoken and
unchallenged. In part, the federal government's absolute, "plenary
power" over matters regarding the admission and deportation of
5. Id
6. See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD
CARE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 54 (1993) (describing
historical legal treatment of mothers and fathers); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995) (revealing the pervasive influence of family images in all areas of law);
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (a collection of
works examining images of mother in the law); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and
Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1996) (addressing male and female images which
promote rape); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women. Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing images of women in the
domestic violence context); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood. Conflicting
Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688
(1998) (discussing the subject of motherhood in welfare, criminal and family law); Amy D.
Ronner, The Cassandra Curse: The Stereotype of the Female Liar Resurfaces in Jones v.
Clinton, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123 (1997) (discussing female biases in sexual harassment
law); Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1996) (addressing
the images of women in adoption, surrogacy and maternal employment); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1749 (1990) (addressing treatment of mothers in equal employment law); Joan Williams,
Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991)
(discussing images of mothers in abortion debate and employment).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ending gender bias in
public school admission policies); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down
gender disparity regarding alcohol consumption); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(striking down legislation denying custodial rights of unwed fathers).
8. Recognizing the limits of the legal system, Jane Murphy advocates the use of
stories to foster greater empathy toward gender issues. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering
for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993). This argument is largely built on the realization that
despite legal successes in the struggle to end racial segregation, racial discrimination and
prejudice continues. See id at 1250-51. Elizabeth Iglesias also urges improving images of
women and men in order to eliminate legal biases. See Iglesias, supra note 6.
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aliens may explain the unchecked control of such biases.9 As one
critic recently quipped, "Immigration scholars love to hate the
plenary power doctrine."' 0 Sovereignty alone, however, does not
explain the absence of attention to gender issues in immigration law.
A great deal has been written, for example, about the influence of
race on immigration." Yet there has been virtually no attention to the
pervasiveness of gender biases in immigration law.12  Why? The
9. For the lead cases acknowledging the federal government's "plenary power" over
immigration, see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953)
(finding Congressional power to determine due process rights of returning residents);
United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (upholding federal
government power to exclude aliens free from judicial review); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698,707 (1893) (finding absolute power to deport aliens); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889) (declaring an
absolute federal power to exclude aliens).
10. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold. Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7 (1998). Indeed, the literature
attacking the plenary power doctrine is vast. For a sampling see, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047
(1994) (outlining differing treatment of aliens based on influence of plenary power over
immigration matters); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (critiquing
plenary power doctrine's unmitigated influence despite other legal developments); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. 545 (1990) (asserting decline of plenary
power doctrine); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 255 (discussing plenary power and its
foundation); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 965 (arguing for end of plenary power doctrine based upon customary and
international law); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1087 (1995) (warning of plenary power doctrine's growing influence over non-
immigration matters).
11. For discussions of race and immigration law, see, e.g., Chin, supra note 10; Kevin
R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American
Experience, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1997), 10 LA RAZA LJ. 173 (1998) (examining the
racial undertones of assimilation); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111
(1998) (revealing recent immigration law's anti-Latino dimension); Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and
Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992) (discussing racial use of English in
immigration provisions); Dorothy Roberts, Who May Give Birth to Citizens:
Reproduction, Eugenics and Immigration, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! 205 (Juan F. Perea ed.,
1997) (finding recent immigration measures a means of targeting racial groups).
12. My own review uncovered only one article which undertook to look for a pattern
of treating gender throughout immigration law. However, rather than addressing the law's
underlying stereotypes of both men and women which affect both U.S. citizens and aliens,
Joan Fitzpatrick's exceptional article dealt exclusively with the law's "complacency" or
"unanticipated" impact upon female immigrants. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender
Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23,26-27 (1997).
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silence only corroborates how deeply engrained gender images have
become. The effect of such images becomes even more disturbing
upon realizing that not only aliens, but U.S. citizens, are affected by
immigration law, oftentimes at the most intimate level. As in Miller,
U.S. citizens must rely upon immigration law to secure citizenship for
family members.13  Immigration law also dictates what family
members of U.S. citizens and residents will be accorded the privilege
of lawful permanent residency in the United States.14 Likewise,immigration law controls which spouses, children, parents and siblings
may be deported.15 By controlling the flow of aliens seeking refuge
within our borders, the law governing asylum also directly impacts
upon the U.S. citizenry.16 It is this daunting power immigration law
wields over the passage of persons which makes uncovering its
underlying gender biases so essential.
This article undertakes to initiate that discovery. Such a task,
however, can only be accomplished after reviewing the legal culture
of gender images. Part I of this article therefore begins by tracing the
images of fathers and mothers which underpin child custody laws.
From this history, an insight can be gained into the Miller decision
and other provisions in immigration law which discriminate against
fathers and their children. Similarly, appreciating the shifting legal
images of women provides a basis for understanding the law's
dangerous treatment of mothers. Yet apart from immigration law's
stereotypical treatment of fathers and mothers, other societal
prejudices are also present. Adhering to the same notions of feminine
goodness which emphasize a woman's primary parenting role,
immigration law also works to treat women as victims. After defining
the female "good victim" and her omnipresence in U.S. domestic law,
Part II points to the presence of this image in various provisions
which restrict a woman's ability to secure residency or asylum and
increase the means for deporting men. By engaging in this overview,
what becomes increasingly apparent is the widespread damage gender
images can unleash.
13. See infra notes 40-77 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 126-133 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
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I. Republican Mothers and Bastards' Fathers
A. Gendered Nationafity Rights
(1) The Tradition of Coverture in Child Custody Law
With the perceptions of each sex's "natural" parental duties in
constant flux, legal thought on the issue of child custody has never
been stagnant. The influence of gender biases began early in the
jurisprudential development of the new U.S. republic. Based on the
"myth of marital unity," coverture declared that by joining in
marriage a man and a woman became a singular entity-embodied by
the husband.' 7 As a result, the husband assumed extensive ownership
rights over his wife's person and property. 8 Coverture's basic
principles thereby also influenced the treatment of children born to a
marriage. Because legitimate children were regarded as marital
property, they too fell under the father's unquestioned authority.19
Consequently, fathers not only owned their children but bore primary
responsibility for their upbringing. Following such expectations of
men as absolute and women as chattel, a mother was regarded as
playing a very minor role in her legitimate children's development,
"entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect."20
By contrast to the treatment of a legitimate child, a child born
out of wedlock was "filius nullius"-the child and heir of no one.21
Without legal relations to his parents, the so-called "bastard child"
was not subject to the laws of custody, maintenance or inheritance.
Such treatment carried both moral and practical implications. By
refusing to legally recognize the illegitimate child, the law intended to
discourage out of wedlock procreation while protecting the rights and
privileges of legitimate children.22 But perhaps more importantly, by
not infringing upon man's independent control of his property and
family lineage, the law of bastardy complemented liberalism's
17. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband." LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 4
(1996) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
442 (W. Lewis ed., 1897)).
18. For a history of coverture's influence over a woman's body and property see
HARRIS, supra note 17, at 3-138.
19. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 234-37 (1985).
20. Id. at 236 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2:452 (George Sharwood ed., 1860)).
21. See id. at 197.
22. See id at 196.
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safeguard of the public/private dichotomy and individualism.3
Despite the contradictory, inapposite treatment of legitimate and
illegitimate children, the laws governing legitimate and illegitimate
children evolved in a similar manner as attitudes toward children and
public welfare developed. By the early nineteenth century, there was
a growing concern for the well-being of children. No longer regarded
simply as small adults, children began to be recognized as "delicate
persons" needing proper care in order to develop as good and moral
beings.24 This change in perceptions was further motivated by the
country's growing industrialization which, by increasing the number
of jobs outside the home, made the job of caring for children even
more critical.25 In the spirit of coverture, women had been regarded
as "devious, sexually voracious, emotionally inconstant, or physically
and intellectually inferior. 26 Now, in order to assure that fathers
could work outside the home while their children were properly
raised, women had to assume a new identity. And so, the nineteenth
century witnessed woman's full transformation from a peripheral
parent to a model of virtue and care.27 Such change was consistent
with the post-revolutionary belief that the future of the nation
warranted the assumption of new duties by the female citizenry. In
order that their male counterparts could get on with the business of
running the nation's government, women were charged as the new
republic's moral leaders 28 The "republican mother" bore primary
responsibility for instilling her children with a sense of civic duty and
commitment.2 9
23. For a criticism of liberalism's efforts to mask male dominance through neutral
principles, abstract rules, and rights talk, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-82 (1986);
Robin L. West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term" Foreword. Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43,45-46 (1990).
24. BERRY, supra note 6, at 54; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 235-37; Sanger,
supra note 6, at 399-403.
25. BERRY, supra note 6, at 51-54; Sanger, supra note 6, at 399-403.
26. BERRY, supra note 6, at 51.
27. See id. at 49-52; Sanger, supra note 6, at 399-409.
28. See LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECr AND IDEOLOGY
IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 199-200, 228-31 (1980); see also Sherry, supra note 23
(chronicling the nation's post-revolutionary rejection of classic republicanism and
acceptance of liberalism, and discussing feminism's reliance on the republican principles of
civic virtue and communitarianism).
29. See BERRY, supra note 6, at 49-52; Williams, supra note 6, at 1564-68. The belief
that feminism embodies the female "ethic of care" as opposed to the male "ethic of
justice" reflects the ongoing influence of socially defined gender roles. For promotion of
feminism's "ethic of care" see, for example, GLENDON, supra note 23, at 134-41; Sherry,
supra note 23, at 581-82. For further discussion of the dangers of the "ethic of care," see
Linda Kelly, Reproductive Liberty Under the Threat of Care: Deputizing Private Agents
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The confluence of factors which contributed to woman's
metamorphosis also brought about the transformation in the legal
treatment of children. The prevailing societal image of mother as
nurturer became legally determinative. Gradually, the father's
entitlement to custody as a property right eroded, as courts began to
invoke judicial discretion to resolve custody disputes in the child's
best interests. Thus, the "tender years" doctrine and its presumption
that mothers should be awarded custody, particularly of young
children, was a natural legal corollary to contemporary gender roles30
In a parallel fashion, these attitudes toward public welfare,
children's "best-interests," and gender roles also transformed the
treatment of children born out of wedlock. Common law disregard
for illegitimate children ended when the "aristocratic, property-
conscious English view by which a heartless monetary interest in
maintaining established lines of descent [was] overruled [by]
compassion and common sense."'31 No longer willing to punish
children for the sins of their parents, the law lost concern with its
moral message and gained interest in ensuring that illegitimate
children did not fall upon the public dole. In keeping with the
century's changing parental roles, mothers also now became the
"natural guardians"32 of illegitimate children while fathers were
viewed as having no power but nevertheless charged with a duty of
support.33  Justifying such determinations, bastardy law now
portrayed mothers as "victims of male lust and irresponsibility" while
fathers were cast as the "debtors and criminals."34 So consumed with
these stereotypes and objectives, paternity and support
determinations risked denying due process to a wrongly charged
father in order to preserve female chastity and ensure a child's
support.35
and Deconstructing State Action, 5 MICH. J. OF GENDER & LAW 81, 95-99 (1998).
30. See GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 237-54.
31. Id. at 204.
32. As found in the groundbreaking Wright v. Wright case which awarded the mother
custody of a child born prior to marriage, "a bastard is generally considered as the relative
of no one. But, to provide for his support and education, the mother has a right to the
custody and control of him, and is bound to maintain him, as his natural guardian."
Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 110 (1806) (Parsons, CJ., concurring). See also
GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 208.
33. See GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 207-18.
34. Id. at 215.
35. For example, the doctrine barring spousal testimony on sexual access prevented a
husband from proving his wife's child belonged to another. "'[T]he wickedness of
mankind makes it necessary for the laws to suppose them better than they really are. Thus
we judge that every child conceived in wedlock is legitimate, the law having a confidence
in the mother as if she were chastity itself."' Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245, 249 (1880)
(quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPrIrr OF THE LAWS); see also GROSSBERG, supra note 19,
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Almost two hundred years later, we remain transfixed by these
familial images. "Good mothers" remain held to the presumption of
virtue and care, while fathers are simply expected to provide financial
support.3 6 Such image reform may have originally empowered
women, entitling them to duties and a legitimacy never before
realized. Today, however, the good mother stereotype impedes the
progress of women.37 Despite the growing necessity and desire of
women to work outside the home, women continue to be regarded as
the primary caretakers.38 As a result, a "vicious cycle" is created.
Women are forced to balance the duties of work and home by
assuming inferior economic positions which, in turn, prevent them
from being considered as equals within the home.39 The damage of
gender images is not, however, limited to affecting women. What is
becoming increasingly evident is that male interests are also thwarted.
The treatment of parents in U.S. immigration law perfectly
illustrates how the injuries of gender images can cross gender lines.
From the earliest legislation to the recent case of Miller v. Albright,
immigration law has consistently adhered to the images which have
at 220.
36. As noted by Carol Sanger, apart from demanding a financial duty, the role of
fathers goes largely unnoticed, while mothers are continually measured against the
tradition of maternal presence. See Sanger, supra note 6, at 378-79 n.11. For a sampling
from the wealth of valuable scholarship, particularly on the role of mothers, see, for
example, BERRY, supra note 6; FINEMAN, supra note 6; MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 6;
Murphy, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6.
37. It should be noted that the value and basis of the female relational being is still
debated in feminist circles. Cultural feminists have championed the interdependent
female, relying heavily upon the 1982 work of psychologist CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE, which positively portrays the female connection to others. See, e.g.,
Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1182-83 (1992); Sherry, supra note 23, at 50, 585-
87; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 493, 500-01
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993). For criticisms of this image of women as limiting female
potential, see, for example, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 51
(1987).
38. According to statistics of the U.S. Bureau of Census, 58.8% of all women were in
the work force by 1994. By contrast, 33.9% of women worked in 1950. Statistics about
"working age" women are more revealing. In 1994, 75.3% of women in the 25 to 54 year
age bracket worked. By comparison, 36.8% of the same age group worked in 1950. See
DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD,
MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 80-82 (1996).
39. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 159 (1989). As
acknowledged by Susan Moller Okin, monetary disparities between husbands and wives
often result in the traditionally lesser-paid woman being regarded as subordinate to her
husband within the marriage. See id. at 134-69. For further discussion of the cycle of
female inferiority and the "Supermom" dilemma, see BERRY, supra note 6, at 4-5
(defining supermom and her limitations); Williams, supra note 6, at 1596-1610
(recognizing the inter-related nature of the work and family debates).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
FAILURES OF LEGAL IMAGES
shaped the treatment of men, women and children in U.S. custody
law.
(2) Miller v. Albright
(a) The Citizenship History of Children and Spouses
Paralleling the domestic treatment of parents and their children,
coverture and its legacy continues to shape U.S. immigration law's
treatment of both alien and citizen parents.40 The evolving doctrine
of "jus sanguinis" or the right to citizenship by descent is a product of
this legacy. Unlike "jus soli" citizenship, a constitutional right
achieved by birth on U.S. soil, the doctrine of jus sanguinis offers no
such protection.41  Consequently, the statutory privilege of jus
sanguinis has shifted with changing conceptions of parental roles.
Given the early treatment of children as paternal property rights,
it is not surprising that the first legislative recognition of jus sanguinis
in 1790 required an alien child to depend on his father's status in the
United States to obtain citizenship. 42 A strict interpretation of the
1790 act might have suggested that a mother's citizenship
conditionally entitled a child born abroad to U.S. citizenship.43
40. Apart from citizenship rights, coverture's restrictive influence on lawful permanent
residency privileges accorded on the basis of marriage to a United States citizen or
resident has also been clearly delineated. See infra notes 87-104, 115-125 and
accompanying text (discussing the family petitioning process and VAWA).
41. "Jus soli" translates as "right of land." This principle forms the basis of the right to
a nation's citizenship by virtue of birth within that nation's territory and is explicitly
protected by the 14th Amendment. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868). By contrast, "jus sanguinis"
which translates as "right of blood" is the right of citizenship by virtue of being the
descendant of citizens. The United States has historically recognized both principles. See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1030-39 (2d
ed. 1997).
For a controversial argument which questions the categorical protection believed to
be offered by the 14th Amendment citizenship provisions, see PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT-ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITY (1985). Cf., Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 485 (1987) (book review).
42. The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or
out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens:
Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descent to persons whose fathers
have never been resident in the United States.
Act of Mar. 26,1790, ch. 3,1 Stat. 104.
43. The power of a mother's citizenship could have been interpreted through the
acknowledgment that citizenship passed to "children of citizens of the United States"
without any gender qualification except the condition that the father had resided in the
United States. ld. For further discussion of this interpretation, see Miller v. Albright, 523
U.S. 420,461-62, (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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However, any theoretical, albeit limited, regard for the mother was
soon eliminated. The legislation of 1855 clarified that citizenship
would only pass to an alien born abroad when the father was a United
States citizen.44
In addition to affecting the rights of children, coverture's
influence on the 1855 legislation also impacted more directly on
women. As of 1855, an alien wife became an automatic citizen if her
husband was or became a United States citizen 45 While the
legislation was defended as a means of preventing alien wives from
becoming stateless upon marriage and preserving their inheritance
rights, the intent of the legislation was not to empower women.
Indeed, the fact that marital naturalization was eliminated shortly
after female citizens secured the constitutional right to vote refutes
any argument that it was originally meant as anything other than an
effort to maintain a woman's dependence upon her husband. 46
Perhaps more telling, several years after the legislation
conferring automatic citizenship on the alien wives of U.S. citizen
husbands, U.S. citizen women were subjected to coverture in an even
starker form. As of 1907, a United States citizen woman who married
an alien man was immediately stripped of her citizenship.47 Under a
law which applied without exception, women were deemed to have
"voluntarily expatriated" by choosing to marry an alien.48 Of course,
44. "All persons heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdictions
of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens
thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall
not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States." Act of Feb. 10,
1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604.
The 1855 legislation was in response to an act passed in 1802 which limited the
citizenship rights of children born abroad to citizens because the legislation failed to apply
to parents who were born or acquired citizenship after 1802. Despite an attempt by
Daniel Webster to pass legislation allowing the children born abroad of United States
citizen fathers or mothers to acquire citizenship, the remedial legislation of 1855 explicitly
prevented mothers from conferring citizenship to their children. See CANDICE LEWIS
BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF
CITIZENSHIP 18-19 (1998); FRANK GEORGE FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO 1861
271-76 (1906). See also Miller, 523 U.S. at 462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604; see also Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S.
496, 498 (1868) (holding that whether husband's citizenship came before or after the 1855
act or before or after the marriage, his wife automatically became a citizen).
46. See Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch. 411, Pub. L. No. 67-346, 42 Stat. 1022.
See also BREDBENNER, supra note 44, at 20-22. For further discussion of how the 19th
Amendment and the events of the early 20th century shaped the role of gender on
immigration law, see infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
47. See Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228-29. Citizenship could be
regained only after termination of the marriage and a successful application for
naturalization by the former United States citizen.
48. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,307-08 (1915).
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the law placed no similar characterization upon men who married
alien women. Instead, as the 1855 Act implied, alien women upon
marriage to citizens were subsumed within their husband's identity.49
Without apology, the Supreme Court invoked coverture to uphold
the legislation expatriating U.S. citizen women, finding that an alien
man and his U.S. citizen's wife's "intimate relation and unity of
interests... make it of public concern in many instances to merge
their identity, and give dominance to the husband.
50
Like the 1855 marital naturalization statute, the 1907 Act's
female expatriation provisions were largely repealed by the 1922
Cable Act and subsequent amendments.51 However, even after such
welcomed corrections to gender inequality, a significant distinction
persisted. Female citizens remained unable to secure citizenship for
their foreign-born children.
As holds true throughout the feminist movement, divergent
politics in the early 20th century prevented critical feminist groups
from agreeing that the right to jus sanguinis citizenship was a matter
demanding gender equality. Facing off during the 1930s, the National
League of Women Voters (NLWV) and the National Woman's Party
(NWP) embodied the two warring viewpoints. The NLWV had
emerged from the remains of the National American Woman
Suffrage Association after the passage of the 19th Amendment and
represented a much more republican, conservative strategy than its
nemesis, the NWP. Like the NWP, the NLWV demanded gender
equality in "political rights." However, the NLWV believed that the
non-political, or social and civil rights, could be gender-based and that
a piecemeal legislative approach was the proper strategy.52 By
contrast, the NWP's post-suffrage agenda remained one of a
49. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussion of 1855 Act).
50. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311 (1915). Reviewing the surge of coverture's influence in
immigration law in the mid 19th century may seem contrary to its declared demise over
such domestic matters as child custody. However, the changes in law and society's
treatment of women were not a direct result of an interest in empowering women but
rather simply an incidental byproduct of other forces. See supra notes 25-39 and
accompanying text. Alternatively, Candice Lewis Bredbenner has argued that while
coverture may have been slowly dying in the area of civil rights, in the political arena
governing such matters as citizenship, it remained in full strength. BREDBENNER, supra
note 44, at 19.
51. See Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, §§ 1-3, 42 Stat. 1021-22. See also Act of July 3,
1930, ch. 835, 46 Stat. 854 (repealing "prospective" expatriation of U.S. citizen women
upon marriage to alien if the couple lived abroad); Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 442, 46 Stat.
1511-12 (removing barrier to repatriation of U.S. citizen women because of marriage to
foreign resident who is ineligible for citizenship); BREDBENNER, supra note 44, at 133-69.
52. With this perspective, the NLWV's agenda included abolishing child labor,
eliminating discrimination against women in the civil service and compulsory civic classes
in public schools. See BREDBENNER, supra note 44, at 153.
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relentless pursuit of absolute equality through sweeping measures on
the international and domestic fronts.53
Despite such differing perspectives, the two groups had agreed
on independent citizenship for married women-the NLWV
characterizing the issue as a political right, while the NWP found it to
be progress toward its equal rights ideal.54 However, the issue of jus
sanguinis presented a more complicated matter. In 1932, the NWP
presented its proposal for the rights of U.S. citizen mothers to confer
citizenship on their foreign-born children. The NLWV made its
opposition clear. By abolishing all distinctions between men and
women, the NWP's latest proposal was "blanket action" which would
create "utter confusion." 55
The NLWV was joined in its opposition to the NWP's equal
nationality proposal not only by members of Congress but also by the
Executive Department. As Professor Bredbenner recounts, the State
Department became the proposal's most "formidable ally."56
Expressing reservations about multiple and absentee citizens, when
the matter came before the 73rd Congress in 1933, Assistant
Secretary of State Wilbur Carr warned that the right of jus sanguinis
for women would produce "alien citizens." When a woman married
an alien and moved abroad "the national character of that country is
likely to be stamped upon the children, so that from the standpoint of
the United States they are essentially alien in character. '57 The
proposal also met with criticism, not as a feminist equal nationality
bill but as an immigration bill which would increase immigration.58
53. See id. For an in depth analysis of the distinctive approaches of the NLWV and
NWP on the international front and their involvement in such post World War I
conferences such as those of the League of Nations and the Pan-American Union, see id.
at 195-242.
54. See id, at 154. Despite different political and strategic agendas succinctly
explained through the timeless equality vs. difference feminist debate, the divergent
groups were in agreement on the issue of federal legislation for ensuring independent
citizenship for married women. For an excellent analysis of the feminist politics
surrounding the women's nationality measures of the early 1930s, see id. at 151-71.
55. This view was expressed in a letter by the NLWV's president, Belle Sherwin,
delivered to the House Committee on Immigration and Nationality. As always, the
explanation for such antagonism was the NLWV's fundamental belief that any measure
which hinted at progress towards an equal rights amendment must be opposed. See id. at
228-30 (quoting Hearings Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain
Children of Mothers Who are Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of
Certain Distinctions in Matters of Nationality, before the House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, 72d Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 7, 1932, at 19; Sherwin letter dated Jan. 7,
1932).
56. Id. at230.
57. Id- (quoting Letter of Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur Carr, House Hearing,
Mar. 28, 1933, Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship States, 9-11).
58. These concerns were raised in the remarks made by Congressmen Charles Kramer
[Vol. 51
With little support, the NWP's proposed bill was likely to be
defeated.5 9 However, coinciding with the domestic debates on the bill
was a successful international effort to pass an equal-nationality
treaty. In December, 1933, the Pan-American Conference at
Montevideo produced an equal-nationality treaty which contained a
resolution urging its signatories to pursue "the maximum equality
between men and women in all matters pertaining to the possession,
enjoyment, and exercise of civil and political rights." 6  Under
growing public pressure to endorse the measure, the Senate ratified
the equal nationality treaty on the same day President Roosevelt
signed legislation equalizing the doctrine of jus sanguinis between the
sexes.
61
While the events of 1934 were a victory, particularly for
equalitarian feminists, it was a short-lived celebration. Images of
republican mothers and bastards' fathers quickly crept back into the
halls of Congress and immigration law. By 1940, the influence of
these stereotypes was evident in new amendments which, for the first
time, distinguished the law's treatment of illegitimate children.
Pursuant to these provisions, children born overseas and out of
wedlock could only become citizens if their mothers were U.S.
citizens and paternity was not established during minority.62 Despite
(CA) and Martin Dies (TX) who, not surprisingly represented states which have
historically had amongst the largest immigrant populations. See id. at 232-33 (relying on
House Hearing, supra note 57, at 37).
59. Despite the NLWV refusal to support the bill, other organizations in support of
the measure included the American Institute of International Law, the National
Association of Women Lawyers and other local associations of female lawyers. See id. at
230.
60. ld. at 238 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT OF THE DELEGATES
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TO THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, DECEMBER 3-26, 1933
(Wash., D.C.: G.P.O.: 1934)).
61. Having stated that the U.S. refusal to sign the 1930 treaty produced at the Hague
Conference on the Codification of International Law was due in part for its failure to
address equal nationality rights for the sexes, the United States was ultimately shamed
into endorsing the Montevideo convention. For a discussion of the Hague Conference,
see id. at 202-16.
For the legislation, see Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797. The legislation also
corrected another disparity in nationality rights by allowing alien husbands to enjoy the
same expedited naturalization process available for alien wives. This was the single other
significant gender disparity which remained after the Cable Act. For further discussion of
the Montevideo convention and the parallel U.S. legislation, see BREDBENNER, supra
note 44, at 238-41.
62. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-876, §§ 201,205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40.
Pursuant to the 1940 act "minor" was defined as an individual under twenty-one years of
age. See idL § 101(g). Regardless of whether a child was born in or out of wedlock, when
only one parent was a United States citizen, a residency requirement was also imposed on
the child and parent. Typically, the parent had to have ten years of U.S. residency prior to
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a father's historic preferential treatment in the nationality rights of
legitimate children, such changes made perfect sense. As opposed to
the powerful image of a wed fathers and his consequent fights, a
bastard's father travailed under a negative image, entitling him to
limited paternal rights.63  The bastard's father could only be
redeemed and entitled to confer citizenship on his out of wedlock,
overseas child if he made an affirmative, formal acknowledgment of
paternity by the act of legitimation or adjudication by a competent
court.64 By placing this demand only on the citizen father, the
measure also confirmed the image of republican mothers as "natural
caretakers," who would care for their children without any legal
prodding.65 However, despite this legal favoring of women, notions of
coverture endured within these provisions. If a father was legally
found, a mother and her right to confer citizenship could be ignored.
Legislation in 1952 eliminated the provision allowing mothers to
confer citizenship only when paternity had not been established. 66
Such a change appeared to be a promising move away from the
traditional notion that mothers are secondary parents, entitled to
parenting privileges by default when the fathers fail to assume
responsibility.67  However, despite this development in equal
nationality rights and such coinciding events as the much publicized
abrogation of the "tender years" doctrine in custody law, the
traditional gender biases were confirmed once again in the 1986immigration amendments.68 Although easing the requirement that a
father must affirmatively, formally acknowledge paternity, the law
also now demands that U.S. citizen fathers agree to financially
support their out of wedlock, foreign-born, minor children. 69 Such
the child's birth (with five years after age sixteen), while the child had to have five years of
U.S. residency prior to age 21. See id. § 201(g). The 1986 amendments reduced the age of
establishing paternity to eighteen. For changes to the residency requirement by the 1986
amendments, see infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
63. For discussion of the varying imagery and legal treatment of fathers, see supra
notes 18-19,33-35 and accompanying text.
64. Act of Oct. 14,1940, Pub. L. No. 76-876, § 205,54 Stat. 1137,1139.
65. For a discussion of such images of mothers and fathers, particularly in custody and
bastardy law, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
66. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 414-477, §§ 301(a)(7),
309(b), 66 Stat. 163,238 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), 1409(b)).
67. For a discussion of how the role of republican mothers only developed when
fathers had to assume more significant roles outside the home, see supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of the abrogation of the "tender years" doctrine by courts and
legislatures, see, for example, GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 248-53; HARRIs, supra note
17, at 604-09.
69. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, sec. 13, § 309(a)(3),(4), 100 Stat. 3655 (1986) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3)(4)). In addition to establishing paternity by legitimation
or court adjudication, it may now also be established by a father's writing under oath. See
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legislation reaffirms the imagery of republican mothers as natural
caretakers and bastards' fathers as debtors and criminals.
(b) Analyzing Miller
Because Miller attempted to combat the images of fathers and
mothers so firmly embedded in U.S. law and culture, the outcome was
predictable. Announcing the judgement of the Court upholding
disparate nationality rights for fathers, Justice Stevens revealed the
persistent influence of gender biases. Placing paternity requirements
solely on citizen fathers of out of wedlock children served the
interests of encouraging a parent-child relationship and fostering a
relationship between the child and the United States in the child's
youth.70 Unlike citizen fathers, citizen mothers would "typically"
have immediate custody of a child born out of wedlock.71 As a result,
a citizen mother would naturally have a relationship with her child by
virtue of the birth. Citizen fathers, on the other hand, needed to
develop such relationships.7 2 Hence, the imposition of requirements
on citizen fathers was justified. In reaching this decision, Justice
Stevens felt he had adhered to the Court's position against relying on
gender stereotypes.73 For Justice Stevens, "biological differences,"
which did not amount to stereotyping, made women the inherent
caretakers.74
The transparency of the Court's decision is readily evident. As
recognized by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, the majority had relied
upon the traditional stereotype that "mothers, as a rule, are
responsible for a child born out of wedlock; fathers unmarried to the
child's mother, ordinarily, are not."75 The majority's failed attempt to
distinguish biological realities from societal stereotypes fits a history
of nonsensical gender distinctions. Such distinctions are as destructive
i L Pursuant to these provisions, fathers must also now establish paternity and agree to
financial support prior to the child's eighteenth birthday. This is a further restriction to
the Act of 1940 which required establishment of paternity by twenty-one years.
Additionally, the 1986 amendments altered the residency requirements on mothers.
Now, mothers are required to reside in the U.S. or its territorial possessions for at least
one year prior to a child's birth. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, sec. 13, § 309(a)(3), (4) 100 Stat.
3655,3657 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3),(4)).
70. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 438.
71. See id.
72- See id. at 443.
73. As recognized when the Supreme Court ended the all-male student practice of the
Virginia Military Institute, the government "may not exclude qualified individuals based
on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718,725 (1982)).
74. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 445.
75. See id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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as they are distracting. As the feminist movement learned in 1907
when a woman lost citizenship by virtue of marrying an alien,
disparate images of men and women prevent gender equality. In
1907, such images most clearly injured women.76 However, ninety
years later, the effect of Miller is to discard citizen fathers and their
children.77 Like Miller and its history, other legislative and judicial
developments in immigration law reveal the continuing impact
negative gender images have upon the rights of women, men and
children.
B. Petitioning for Residency-The Legal Corollary to Gendered
Nationality
Consistent with the gender disparities evident in the right to
confer citizenship, the ability of fathers to secure lawful permanent
residency for children born out of wedlock is also more restricted
than the rights of mothers. Again, the difference stems from legal
imagery-that mothers possess a "natural capacity to nurture and
protect" 78 while fathers must affirmatively prove their parenting
capabilities. Announcing Fiallo v. Bell in 1977, the Supreme Court
upheld sections of the INA which excluded both citizen and lawful
permanent resident fathers from petitioning for the residency of their'
foreign children born out of wedlock.79 While the legislation placed
no restrictions whatsoever on the right of mothers to petition for their
illegitimate, foreign-born children, the Court found no equal
protection violation. Raising Congress' inherent sovereign power to
exclude aliens, the Court deemed the matter "largely immune" from
76. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (regarding the 1907 Act and its
history).
77. I am grateful for Professor Bredbenner's use of the term "discardable American"
to highlight the severity of the nationality provisions which have discriminated based upon
gender. See BREDBENNER, supra note 44, at 6 (discussing the 1940 Act's discrimination
against women).
78. Murphy, supra note 6, at 713 (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and
Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95,111 (1993)).
79. Fiallo's plaintiffs were fathers and their out of wedlock children. See Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding INA §§ 101(b)(1)(D), 101(b)(2) (1952)).
Securing lawful permanent residency for one's child through the family petitioning
process of the INA is clearly a lesser privilege than a child's right to secure citizenship
based upon the citizenship of his parent through the derivative citizenship provisions.
However, both processes are necessary as a child is not eligible for derivative citizenship
unless the parent was a U.S. citizen at the time of the child's. birth and the relevant U.S.
residency criterion are met. Consequently, the children of lawful permanent residents
have no right to derivative citizenship and therefore must rely upon the family petitioning
process. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of derivative
citizenship). For a general discussion of the INA's family petitioning process, see
LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 131-70.
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judicial control.80 Rights of citizen as well as lawful permanent
resident fathers simply were discarded again, this time through the
plenary power doctrine.81 The Court ignored the principle applied in
all other contexts, that the parental right to rear children is limited
only by a "compelling governmental interest."2 Only Justice
Marshall's dissent acknowledged the glaring disparity. "When
Congress grants a fundamental right to all but an invidiously selected
class of citizens, and it is abundantly clear that such discrimination
80. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 n.5. At best, there has been a willingness to recognize
some limited judicial responsibility in immigration matters. Yet despite such recognition,
restrictive laws, like that in Fiallo, have generally been upheld. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson,
472 U.S. 846 (1985) (avoiding the constitutional issue of an equal protection guarantee for
Haitians asserting discrimination in detention conditions because of statutory obligations);
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982) (recognizing lawful permanent resident's right
to procedural due process); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,766-67 (1972) (upholding
exclusion of alien and denying First Amendment challenge while recognizing due process
restrictions on congressional sovereign power); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
589 (1952) (defeating constitutional challenge, finding immigration power "largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference").
81. While Miller would later also uphold a gender disparity, the majority opinion
acknowledged that the rights of potential U.S. citizen children and their fathers required
higher scrutiny than the plenary power doctrine afforded. Although the father of the
plaintiff in Miller was not a party to the suit when it reached the Supreme Court, the
majority found the plaintiff had the right to raise the alleged discrimination against her
father as well as against herself. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433. While Justice Breyer in his
dissenting opinion agreed with the daughter's right to raise her father's claim as well as her
own, see id (Breyer, J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor in her concurrence rejected the
daughter's third party standing right, see id. at 446 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
plaintiff's father had originally been a plaintiff but was dismissed for lack of standing when
the case originated before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. See Miller v. Christopher, C.A. No. 6:93 CV 39 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 1993).
82. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 807-09, 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Through a host of cases, the Court continues to vigilantly protect "a private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944). That fathers and mothers merit equal protection unencumbered by gender
stereotypes is most evident in Stanley v. Illinois in which the Court rejected legislation
permitting unwed fathers to lose custody rights without a hearing. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972). For further cases protecting the familial rights of fathers, see, for
example, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (rejecting restrictions on a father's right
to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (rejecting efforts
to sterilize male criminals). Of course, the issues of gender equality and fundamental
familial rights do not need to be conflated in order to legitimately criticize the Fiallo
decision. As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent, the immigration provisions challenged
in Fiallo were vulnerable under the intermediary test for gender or legitimacy
classification or as a result of violating fundamental familial rights. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
809-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a criticism of the ongoing restrictions U.S. immigration law places upon
fundamental familial rights, see Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family
Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of
Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725 (1996).
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would be intolerable in any context but immigration, it is our duty to
strike the legislation down. '83
Faced with such pressure, Congress amended the discriminatory
provisions challenged in Fiallo.84 The change, however, was not
complete. Petitioning rights of unwed fathers remain more restricted
than the rights of mothers. According to statute, an unwed father
may only successfully petition for his undocumented children upon
showing he "has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship." 85
Unwed mothers face no similar distinction. The disparate pattern
and all its imagery is once more illustrated.
As the citizenship and residency provisions consistently reveal,immigration law continues to insist upon promoting mothers as
natural nurturers while presuming that fathers are insignificant, if not
absent, figures. Such characterizations seem steadfast despite the
slow rejection of gender stereotyping in other areas of law.86
Unfortunately, the gender biases of immigration law are not limited
to parental images. The myth of feminine goodness underlying the
woman-as-nurturer image has clearly affected other aspects of
immigration law. Most notably, provisions intended to protect
women from spousal assault, rape, and other forms of gender violence
adhere to images which not only challenge women seeking relief, but
also prevent progress toward gender equality.
H. Good Victims
A. The Violence Against Women Act
(1) Immigration's History of Domestic Violence
The 1994 passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
was a significant milestone in immigration history.87 For the first
83. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. See IRCA § 315(a) (1986).
85. INA § 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1999).
86. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing law and legal literature's
treatment of gender stereotypes).
87. Congress passed VAWA as part of the Violence Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.). Outside of immigration jurisprudence,
VAWA is perhaps most known for the controversial federal civil remedies it offers
survivors of domestic violence. The federal civil remedies provisions fall under Title III of
the Act, entitled "Civil Rights for Women." 42 U.S.C. § 13 (§ 13981) 981 (1994). Such
provisions have been the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th
Cir. 1997); 169 F. 3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding VAWA provisions
unconstitutional), cert. granted sub nom Brzonkala v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). Doe
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time, battered aliens were given the statutory means to independently
secure lawful permanent residency. Fashioning a "self-petitioning"
process for battered aliens who are either the spouses or children of
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, VAWA removed the
need for a domestic violence survivor to depend upon her batterer in
the family petitioning process.88
Changes to the family petitioning process for battered aliens had
been needed for many years. As Janet Calvo explained in an
important work shortly before VAWA's passage, the process
continued to toil under "the legacies of coverture." 89  Like the
treatment of derivative citizenship rights based upon family ties, the
first residency provisions of the twentieth century clearly
demonstrated coverture's influence. These provisions created a
means for otherwise inadmissible female aliens to secure lawful
permanent residency in the United States upon marriage to a U.S.
v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding Title HI constitutional).
Title III's constitutionality has been the subject of scholarly debate, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court's position on the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995). See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297 (1998); Lisanne Newell Leasure, Commerce Clause
Challenges Spawned by United States v. Lopez Are Doing Violence to the Violence Against
Women ACT (VAWA): A Survey of Cases and the Ongoing Debate over How the VAWA
Will Fare in the Wake of Lopez, 50 ME. L. REV. 409 (1998); Charis Mincavage, Comment,
Title IfI of the Violence Against Women Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge
in the Wake of United States v. Lopez?, 102 DICK. L. REv. 441 (1998).
In addition to the federal civil remedies, other VAWA provisions provide funding for
victims, create federal penalties for sex crimes, and institute new evidentiary rules
regarding sexual history in both the civil and criminal context. VAWA (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18,28,42 U.S.C.); see also Mincavage, supra.
88. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(A)(1)(iii)-(iv); §
204(a)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (allowing family petitioning).
VAWA also created a special form of "cancellation of removal," for battered
immigrants. See INA § 240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). While a discussion of
cancellation of removal is beyond the scope of this article, its criteria contain the basic
requirements of VAWA's family petitioning provisions. Cancellation of removal requires
a battered alien to be 1) inadmissible or deportable; 2) battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty by a citizen or permanent resident spouse or parent; 3) physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of three years; 4) a person of good moral character
for the past three years; 5) able to demonstrate extreme hardship to the alien, alien's child
or alien's parent (if the alien is a child). See iL These provisions vary from the VAWA
family petitioning process in that pursuant to cancellation, an alien may be inadmissible
and still eligible for relief. However, even more importantly, cancellation of removal is a
critical option for some alien spouses because, unlike the family petitioning process, a
cancellation of removal request can be made after an alien is divorced. Compare INA §
204(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii), with INA§ 240A(b)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).
89. See Janet Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28
SAN DIEGO L REv. 593 (1991).
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citizen while making no similar exception for alien husbands.90 More
recent provisions continued the gender bias, albeit in a less overt
manner. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the
foundation of our current law, removed explicit gender distinctions
but continued the practice of allowing the U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident to unilaterally control the process of petitioning
for his spouse's residency.91 For battered alien wives, the effect was
to perpetuate coverture's basic principal that a woman belongs to her
husband. Only he could provide for her residency.
In 1986, the Immigration and Marriage Fraud Amendments
(IMFA) exacerbated the power differential.92 Passed in reaction to
widespread legislative and administrative fear of marriage-based
fraud, the provisions complicated the petitioning process by requiring
the alien and petitioning spouse to complete the petitioning process
approximately two years after the alien was awarded "conditional
residency" in the initial processing phase.93  By extending the
petitioning spouse's involvement in further petitions and interviews,
an abusive spouse was legally provided with the opportunity to
continue the battering.
Responding to the "gender-specific impacts" of IMFA's "gender-
neutral" terms, Congress corrected IMFA's harshest measures by
providing an exception to the two-year joint filing requirement for
battered spouses through the Immigration Act of 1990.94 Pursuant to
this change, battered spouses who had already acquired conditional
residency became entitled to file petitions individually for the
90. Female spouses of U.S. citizens and residents remained admissible despite health-
related exclusionary grounds and national and numeric quotas. See id. at 598-603
(discussing immigration law from the early 1900s through 1950s). For a discussion of other
earlier gender disparities for alien spouses, see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
91. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter 1952 Act], Pub. L. No.
414,66 Stat. 166 (1952); Calvo, supra note 89, at 603-05.
92. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
INA, 8 U.S.C.); see also Calvo, supra note 89, at 606-12.
93. While a "conditional resident" is entitled to all the privileges of residency, 90 days
prior to the expiration of the two year conditional period, an alien and her spouse must
file a petition to remove conditions on residency. This process may include an additional
interview of both spouses. See INA § 216(a), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a), (g) (1994). The
legislation was based upon INS' assertions that at least 30% of the marriages in marriage-
based immigrant petitions were fraudulent. While such claims later were deemed
inaccurate, the conditional residency process remains. For more on conditional residency
and its legislative history, see, for example, Calvo, supra note 89, at 606-12; Linda Kelly,
Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against
Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 669-71, 688 n.119 (1998), LEGOMSKY, supra note 41,
at 148-49.
94. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 [hereinafter 1990 Act]; Kevin R. Johnson,
Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity,
Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509,1551 (1995).
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removal of the condition on residency.95 However, such changes did
not eliminate coverture's influence. The 1990 amendments only
applied to battered alien spouses who had first acquired conditional
residency with their lawful spouses' assistance. As a result, after the
1990 amendments, a battered alien spouse remained unable to self-
initiate the residency process. Undocumented battered spouses thus
remained married and subject to physical and emotional abuse,
choosing this hostage-like alternative over the possibility of
deportation and poverty which awaited them if they left.96
After years of proposals, VAWA was passed.97 Without
question, the legislation has been responsible for allowing many
women to achieve residency.98 However, despite this relief, the
particular requirements of VAWA reveal persistent, and familiar,
attitudes toward women. If a VAWA applicant fails to personify a
stereotypical image of a battered woman, her application will be
denied. Consequently, through VAWA, immigration law once again
reveals the damage of inflexible legal imagery.
(2) VA WA's Requirements and Biases
To establish a successful VAWA claim, an applicant must meet
four basic criteria:
1) ABUSE--during the marriage the alien spouse or child has been
"battered by or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated
by the alien's spouse;" 99
95. The exception to joint filing requires proof of "good faith marriage" and that the
alien spouse or child was "battered or subject to extreme cruelty." The waiver is gender
neutral. See INA § 216(c)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C). For more on IMFA, see
Calvo, supra note 89, at 612-13; Kelly, supra note 93, at 670-71.
96. See Calvo, supra note 89, at 612-13; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1247-50 (1991); Kelly, supra note 93, at 670-71.
97. See H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-395 (1993); see also Janet
Calvo & Martha Davis, Congress Nears Approval of Legislation to Protect Abused Aliens,
70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1665 (1993).
98. While VAWA's feminine title reveals its intent to help battered wives, the
statutory provisions are gender-neutral, thereby also allowing battered husbands to rely
upon them to achieve residency. In this article, discussion of domestic violence will refer
to the man as the abuser and the woman as the abused. This intuitive characterization is
consistent with a study finding that 95 to 98% of the victims of spousal battery are women.
Of the 2 to 5% of female perpetrators, a majority have been found to be engaging self-
defense. See MICHAEL MCKENZIE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 9 (1995); R.
EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); see also
LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
99. The provision allows allen spouses to achieve residency whether they or their
children are subject to abuse. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii);
INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). A battered allen child is also
independently able to secure residency without the assistance of his parent. See INA §
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2) VALID MARRIAGE WITH THE QUALIFYING SPOUSE-
the alien entered the marriage with either a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident'0 in "good faith"''1 and has resided in the
United States with the qualifying spouse;102
3) GOOD MORAL CHARACTER-the alien has been a person
of good moral character;10 3 and
4) EXTREME HARDSHIP-the alien's removal would be an
"extreme hardship" to the alien or the alien's child.' 04
(a) The Skepticism of Abuse and Good Faith Marriage
The need to demonstrate abuse and good faith marriage may
seem appropriate requirements. However, a battered alien's ability
to satisfy such conditions is impeded by supplemental regulatory
instructions which virtually insist upon formal, public records to prove
both the abuse and validity of the marriage.10 5 Caught at the
intersection of domestic violence and immigration, battered aliens are
uniquely challenged by this request. Given the private nature of
domestic violence, a battered woman often does not seek the public
assistance evidenced by the police reports, hospital records and court
orders which are necessary to demonstrate abuse.1 6 Additionally, the
204(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv). For the administrative regulations
governing VAWA see 8 C.F.R. § 204.2.
100. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(fii); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii),
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). Similar provisions exist for the alien children of abusive U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(1)(A)(iv); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(iii).
101. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I); INA §
204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii).
102. See id A residency requirement also exists for the alien children of abusive U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(1)(A)(iv); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(iii).
103. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii),
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). A good moral character requirement also exists for the
children of abusive U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. See INA §
204(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). Pursuant to regulation, good moral character must be demonstrated for
the three years preceding the application. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c).
104. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II); INA §
204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). An extreme hardship requirement also
exists for the children of abusive U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. See INA §
204(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv)(ll); INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(iii)(H), 8
U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(iii)(II).
105. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2.
106. Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 339, 344, 354-56 (1995); Mahoney, supra
note 6, at 47-48; Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1295, 1302-03 (1993).
controlling dynamic of domestic violence dissuades battered spouses
from seeking help for fear of further reprisals.10 7 This power dynamic
also makes it difficult to prove good faith marriage. Unlike a
traditional "healthy" marriage, replete with joint assets and debts, in
an abusive marriage, the abuser is likely to maintain all records in his
name alone. Such conditions which challenge a battered wife's ability
to demonstrate the abuse and good faith marriage are further
exacerbated by her lack of immigration status. Undocumented and
fearing deportation, a battered alien is understandably unwilling to
surface before any official or person who may contact immigration
officials. 108
The abuse and good faith marriage requirements are likely based
upon combined skepticisms regarding the honesty of aliens and the
pervasiveness of domestic abuse.1 9 From the earliest immigration
law and its stereotyping of Chinese immigrants, there has been a
willingness to portray aliens as forever foreign, unassimilable, and
untrustworthy."10 More recent judicial and legislative expectations
that aliens must "Americanize" perpetuate this sentiment of distrust.
The result is to limit an alien's ability to secure residency or other
legal remedies."' For battered aliens, the challenge of such
107. For discussions of domestic violence as a tool of power and control rather than
simply an act of domestic violence, see, for example, DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 98,
at ix; Mahoney, supra note 6, at 53-55. This understanding of domestic violence developed
from earlier perspectives that stressed the physical aspect of domestic abuse. See, e.g.,
WALKER, supra note 98, at xv.
108. For further discussion of the challenge imposed by the good faith marriage and
abuse requirements in VAWA see Kelly, supra note 93, at 675-84.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 704 (1893) (upholding
federal legislation requiring the testimony of "one credible white witness" in order for a
Chinese to prevent his deportation). See also Kelly, supra note 93, at 688-92 (reviewing
the legal perception of the "lying immigrant"); Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in
American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1186,1190 (1985)
(book review) (attaching to foreigness the concept of "unassimilable strangers").
In a new attack on the plenary power doctrine, Professor Gabriel Chin
straightforwardly argues that given the racist underpinnings of the plenary power doctrine,
the Supreme Court has more than sufficient reason to abandon it. See Chin, supra note
10.
111. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S 214, 223 (1944) (justifying the
internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during World War II based upon an
implied lack of loyalty); U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 121 (1997) (urging aliens to become
"Americanized" by learning English and becoming wed to American cultural and political
ideals).
Many critical reviews have also been published on the troublesome concept of
assimilation. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 11; KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 83-85, 95-100; Kenneth L.
Karst, Paths to Belonging, The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303,
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misperceptions is aggravated by the addition of negative societal
biases toward battered women.
As part of the effort to deny the extent of intimate violence,
societal and legal attitudes toward domestic violence remain laden
with insinuations regarding battered women.112 Characterizing the
battered woman as a "pushy bitch" who must have been "asking for
it" is a common stereotype often evident in an abuser's defense to
domestic violence charges. 13 Maintaining the negative imagery, the
alternative popular defense is to charge the battered woman as a liar,
who is only alleging spousal assault in order to get a "quick fix"
response to her request for exclusive right to the home, child custody
or other legal sympathies.114
(b) The Good Victim of Good Moral Character and Extreme Hardship
Recognizing the inherent distrust of both aliens and battered
women, the rationale of VAWA's good moral character and extreme
hardship requirements seems evident. Combined, these two criteria
force battered aliens to overcome society's negative presumptions.
By requiring good moral character and extreme hardship, VAWA
awards relief only to those women who have legally redeemed
themselves as "good victims." Such a demand is in keeping with a
U.S. jurisprudential tradition of only awarding relief to female
litigants who personify the image of feminine goodness. In U.S.
domestic laws governing not only domestic violence but others forms
of gender violence such as rape and sexual harassment, the successful
good victim is helpless, virginal, and completely without fault.115 The
312-20 (1986); Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 185, 197-209 (1998); Peter Margulies, The Identity
Question, Madeline Albright's Past, and Me: Insights from Jewish and African American
Law and Literature, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 595 (1997); Roberts, supra note 11.
112. As Martha Mahoney reasons, the "[m]assive denial" of the prevalence of domestic
violence is welcomed by society and the legal system in order to minimize societal
responsibility. See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 11-13; see also Kelly, supra note 93, at 693-95
(describing how denying the reality of domestic violence limits the understanding of what
constitutes abuse); Meier, supra note 106 (asserting that a refusal to acknowledge male
domination over women prevents realizing the prevalence of domestic violence). For
discussion of how societal denial of domestic violence also impacts women seeking asylum,
see infra notes 186-193 and accompanying text.
113. See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 12-13.
114. See J. Cheney Mason, Dr. Jekyll or Mr./Ms. Hyde? Representing the Abused or the
Abuser, in 'TIL DEATH Do Us PART: PRACTICAL ADvOCACY FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES 3.1 (Florida Bar CLE Committee ed., 1997).
115. For further discussion of the negative portrayal of women implied by rape shield
statutes and utilized as a defense in sexual harassment cases, see Iglesias, supra note 6, at
929-32; Linda Kelly, Transcending Borders: Escaping the Confines of Gender Violence, in
EDUCATING FOR JUsTICE AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL
PRACTICE, AND THE COMMUNITY 195,204-05 (1999); Ronner, supra note 6, at 134-38.
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demand for such traits is dramatically evident in the VAWA criteria
of good moral character and extreme hardship.
Statutorily defined, the good moral character prong is prima
facie evidence that the law insists successful VAWA applicants be
scrupulous individuals. 116 This may be a legitimate condition placed
on aliens seeking residence in the United States. However, VAWA
applicants are the only aliens achieving residency through the family
petitioning process who must demonstrate this quality.117 Why is this
condition not placed upon aliens who secure residency with the
cooperation of their nonabusive spouses or other family members?
To suggest that placing this requirement on VAWA applicants is in
response to the supposed threat of increased fraud in a self-
petitioning process seems misplaced. 118 An alien able to successfully
file a VAWA claim which fraudulently asserts a good faith, but
abusive marriage will not be discovered simply by requiring proof of
good moral character. Instead, the good moral character requirement
seems part of the common willingness to blame and discredit the
battered women." 9 VAWA's demand for good moral character thus
ensures that the successful battered alien will not only overcome
these negative presumptions-she will radiate an unblemished image.
Like the good moral character requirement, the extreme
hardship requirement is uniquely imposed on VAWA applicants in
the family petitioning process.120 Reviewing the definition of extreme
hardship utilized for VAWA once again reveals the stereotypical
reasoning underlying this criterion. Extreme hardship has
traditionally been a requirement for other forms of statutory relief.'2 '
116. A person may be found to lack good moral character if she 1) is a habitual
drunkard; 2) is engaging in prostitution; 3) is smuggling; 4) is practicing polygamy; 5) has
been convicted of or has admitted to certain crimes of moral turpitude; 6) has given false
testimony for immigration benefits; or 7) is denied for discretionary reasons not
specifically enumerated. See INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). For a regulatory discussion
of the application of the good moral character requirement to VAWA applicants see 8
C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(v), (e)(1)(vii). For a critical analysis of the requirement in VAWA
cases, see Kelly, supra note 93, at 686-87.
117. See generally INA § 204,8 U.S.C. § 1154.
118. See, e.g., Felicia E. Franco, Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant
Women, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 99,121-23 (1996).
119. Characterizing battered women as liars ignores the reality that domestic violence is
underreported, not overreported. See WALKER, supra note 98, at 19. As recognized by
U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala, "Domestic violence is an
unacknowledged epidemic in our society." Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits Home,
TIME, July 4, 1994, at 20.
120. See INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(ll); INA §
204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). See also supra notes 99-104 and
accompanying text (discussing basic VAWA eligibility).
121. Extreme hardship was traditionally associated with a form of relief known as
"suspension of deportation." See INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1995). However, since
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Without a statutory definition, the definition of extreme hardship
evolved through judicial and administrative reasoning, with a
successful showing dependent upon the circumstances of each case
and the ingenuity of the alien and his advocate.122 Yet despite this
amorphous history, the administrative test of extreme hardship
applied to VAWA applicants has been narrowly tailored to the
circumstances surrounding the domestic violence. Pursuant to
regulation, VAWA applicants are encouraged to base their extreme
hardship showing upon evidence regarding the length and severity of
the violence, the need to access U.S. medical, social and legal services
for battered women and children, the lack of similar services in the
home country, and the attitudes the battered woman would encounter
in her home country because of the domestic violence stigma.123
Moreover, when the INS is inclined to deny a VAWA application
because of an insufficient showing of extreme hardship, the request
for further information accompanying the "Notice of Intent to Deny"
(NOID) recites a boilerplate list of conditions which all associate the
test of extreme hardship with the domestic violence endured.124
Like the good moral character requirement, imposing the
extreme hardship requirement upon VAWA applicants in the family
petitioning process does not reduce fraud. Showing the availability of
victim services in the Unites States and the lack of such services at
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [hereinafter
URIRA] and its replacement of "suspension" with a stricter form of "cancellation of
removal" for non-VAWA applicants, extreme hardship now essentially exists as a
criterion for VAWA applicants and individuals seeking more limited waivers on
inadmissibility. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended
at INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b); see also IIRIRA § 308(a)(7) (repealing suspension of
deportation, formerly INA § 244 (1995)).
The "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" test of cancellation of removal for
non-VAWA applicants is clearly a higher burden than the "extreme hardship" test utilized
for VAWA self-petitioners and cancellation of removal applicants. On the VAWA
extreme hardship test, see INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1); INA § 240A(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (1996). On waivers utilizing extreme hardship, see, for example, INA §
212(h)-(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)-(i). For further history of the extreme hardship test and its
uses, see Kelly, supra note 93, at n.105.
122. See, e.g, In re O-J-O, Int. Dec. 3280 (BIA 1996). VAWA regulations also
recognize in non-VAWA cases that "extreme hardship" must be shown on a case-by-case
basis, but such regulations also acknowledge such conditions as an alien's age, infirmity,
ties to the United States and lack of ties abroad as common to establishing extreme
hardship. See Self-Petitioning, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061,13,067 (1996).
123. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(viii), (c)(2)(vi); Self-Petitioning, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,067.
124. As a professor supervising the VAWA cases of the St. Thomas University School
of Law Immigration Clinic, I have received numerous NOIDs related to extreme hardship.
Each one contains an identical list of factors, all related to linking extreme hardship with
the domestic violence. Anticipating such requests, the Clinic now successfully preempts
such letters by submitting in the original VAWA application a memorandum of law which
argues the existence of each factor typically seen on the NOID.
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home has no bearing on credibility. Rather than exposing fraudulent
applicants, the extreme hardship requirement seems to serve another
purpose. The extreme hardship requirement ensures that the only
successful VAWA applicants will be victims who demonstrate a
critical dependence upon the services of the United States in order to
survive. By insisting that a successful VAWA applicant embody the
stereotypical, helpless woman, VAWA's extreme hardship
requirement perpetuates the good victim image that permeates U.S.
laws intended to assist battered women.125 Weakness is rewarded,
while strength is denied. Through VAWA's requirements, the U.S.
government simply steps in and replaces the batterer as the
stereotypical controlling, needed presence in the battered woman's
life.
B. Deporting Domestic Violence Offenders
(1) The Amendments of 1996
Encouraging domestic violence survivors to be victims, entirely
dependent upon the U.S. government, is not only perpetuated by the
changes made by VAWA in 1994. With the passage of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Congress again addressed domestic violence inimmigration. 126 A major overhaul of immigration law, IIRIRA
expanded the grounds for removing aliens and attempted to increase
the absolute nonreviewability of federal action in immigration
matters.1 27 Amongst the amendments was the creation of a new
125. Common to earlier understandings of domestic violence was the notion of
"learned helplessness" which suggested that a battered woman was unable to leave a
battering relationship because over time she had been conditioned to be weak and
subservient. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 39 n.170 and accompanying text. For discussions
of how this characteristic is still evident and the consequences of failing to portray this
image in the domestic violence context see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing
defenses toward domestic violence). The need to personify the good victim is also evident
in laws governing the gender violence crimes of rape and sexual harassment. See Iglesias,
supra note 6, at 902-43; Ronner, supra note 6.
126. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
127. Another significant measure aimed at aliens in 1996 was the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-232, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
[hereinafter AEDPA]. For a discussion of both AEDPA and IIRIRA see Lucas
Guttentag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions
and Constitutional Rights, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson, The
Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ.
833 (1997); Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immigration Act: Criminal Aliens and Terrorists, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1713 (1996). For a general discussion of the criminal
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grounds of removability for any alien who is convicted of a crime of
domestic violence or has been found in violation of certain provisions
of a domestic violence protection order.' 8 Introducing the measure,
Senator Bob Dole straightforwardly stated its purpose. "[O]ur society
will not tolerate crimes against women and children."'129
Despite the publicity surrounding IIRIRA, scant attention has
been given to the provision allowing domestic violence offenders to
be deported. 30 However, for several reasons this provision is more
aggressive than many of the changes made. Unlike the grounds of
deportability for "crimes of moral turpitude," deportability for a
domestic violence offense is not limited by any consideration of the
length of sentence or how many years after admissibility the crime
was committed.'3 ' More striking, an individual found by a court to
have violated the terms of a domestic violence injunction which
enjoins further violence does not have to be convicted in a criminal
court in order to be deported. An individual may be deportable upon
a finding of contempt by either a civil or criminal court.132
Deportability for all other criminal offenses statutorily requires
convictions 33
deportation provisions of the INA, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 408-53. For a review
of the waivers available in exclusion and expulsion proceedings for family members of
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents prior to IIRIRA and a comparison to
German immigration provisions see Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A
Roadmap for the Ruritarian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 532-34 (1995).
128. This provision applies equally to lawful permanent residents and undocumented
aliens. See IIRIRA § 350 (codified as amended at INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(E)). Also included in this new ground is deportability for crimes against
children, such as child abuse, child neglect or child abandonment. See id.
129. Bob Dole, Children Deportable Offenses, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE,
April 25, 1996. For a history of the Senate's bill, S. 1664, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996), see
Paul Coverdell, Coverdell-Dole Introduce Deportation Amendment, CONGRESSIONAL
PRESS RELEASE, April 24, 1996; Paul Coverdell, Update: Senate Approves Coverdell-Dole
Deportation Amendment, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE, April 25, 1996; Bob Dole,
Illegal Immigration Reform Passes, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE, May 2, 1996;
Republican Platform Committee Adopts Coverdell-Dole Measure to Protect Women and
Children, 1996 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS, August 7, 1996 (available
on Lexis); see also Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of
1996,11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303,304 n.4 (1997).
130. For further discussion of the deportability of domestic violence offenders, see
Kelly, supra note 129.
131. An alien is deportable for being convicted of one crime of moral turpitude "for
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" generally only if such crime is
committed within five years after the date of admission. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(ii). There is no consideration of sentence or time of commission
in the domestic violence deportability ground. See INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(E).
132. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
133. INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
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(2) Revictimizing Women
The unequivocal nature of the domestic violence ground of
deportability may be hailed as a bold step away from the traditional
focus in U.S. domestic violence laws on the victim and the consequent
implication that she is the problem.TM By redirecting the focus, theimmigration ground explicitly acknowledges that the cause of
domestic violence is the perpetrator.135 Yet despite this strong stance,
the commitment of the measure to battered women should be
questioned. By creating an absolute ground of deportability,
Congress "revictimizes" the very population of battered women it
seeks to assist.136 In so doing, this provision adheres to the rationale
supporting other gender-driven immigration measures.137 Because
women are dependent creatures, unable to care for themselves, they
must rely upon the U.S. government for their survival.138 Such
characterizations are not only untrue, but risk placing women and
their children in greater danger.
By subjecting domestic violence offenders unconditionally to
deportation, the immigration provision is vulnerable to the same
criticism levied against such criminal law practices as mandatory
arrest and coerced victim participation in prosecutions. 3 9 Once the
need for the survivor's cooperation in the legal process is removed,
the government effectively replaces the abusive spouse as the
134. See generally Mahoney, supra note 6. See also Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions [hereinafter "No Right
to Choose"], 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1879-80 (1996); Meier, supra note 106, at 1317-18;
MCKENZIE, supra note 98, at 53.
135. See Kelly, supra note 129, at 305.
136. For discussions of "revictimization" in others areas of law, see, for example, Meier,
supra note 106, at 1333-34 (defining role of a domestic violence advocate as an attentive,
empathetic listener to prevent "usurping [the battered woman's] autonomy and
decisionmaking." Compare with Hanna, supra note 134, at 1884 (suggesting a battered
woman's resilience and strength prevents revictimization when the government
unilaterally prosecutes).
137. See supra notes 40-125 and accompanying text (discussing conferring citizenship,
the family-petitioning process and VAWA) and infra notes 145-193 and accompanying
text (discussing asylum).
138. See supra notes 45-51, 116-125 and accompanying text (discussing nationality and
VAWA provisions, respectively, which reflect such dependency and duty to care).
139. Compare Hanna, supra note 134 (advocating mandated victim participation in
criminal domestic violence prosecutions), with Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One
Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact
Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. OF GENDER & LAW 493, 498-500 (1995)
(discussing the legal system's role in marginalizing domestic violence survivors); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE:
THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 36,49-53 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykituk eds., 1994).
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controlling agent.140 Deporting the batterer also jeopardizes other
legitimate interests of a survivor. Rather than protecting the survivor,
the provision places her at further risk. The threat of "separation
assault" is magnified. Now that the abuser faces deportation, he may
resort to more desperate and violent measures in response to his
imminent loss of power and control over his spouse. 141  In other
respects, the survivor's physical well-being is also jeopardized.
Despite being battered, the survivor often relies upon her batterer for
her needs and the attendant needs of her children.142 Such needs may
include such basic necessities as food and shelter.143 Beyond physical
demands, unilaterally deporting abusers ignores the very real
emotional ties a battered woman may still have to her mate. Love
and other feelings such as the desire to help and protect her abuser
(despite his behavior) are strong emotions that do not simply end
when the abuse begins.144
The deportation of domestic violence offenders has serious
consequences. Not only does it undermine the image of women, it
attacks their physical and emotional well-being. Moreover, despite
140. I have previously suggested that such control could be eliminated by allowing a
battered woman's participation in the deportation proceedings of her abuser. Kelly, supra
note 129, at 324-26.
141. Because the time of separating from one's abuser can be the most dangerous,
separation assault is a dynamic of domestic violence that can not be ignored. As Mahoney
explains the term:
Separation assault is the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her
partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force
her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she will
live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship. It is an
attempt to gain, retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman
for ending the relationship. It often takes place over time.
Mahoney, supra note 6, at 65-66.
142. Children are cited as the most common reason a battered woman stays with her
abuser. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 98, at 148. Such rationale remains
controversial as children are subject to emotional and physical harm by remaining in a
violence household. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 98, at 27-28 (citing study in which one
third of wife batterers beat their children); DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 98, at 105-52
(discussing the risk toward children).
143. See, e.g., Kimberle Creshaw, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL.
L. REV. 891, 893 (1995) (reporting that nearly 85% of women in a Los Angeles shelter
return to an abusive relationship due to difficulties finding housing and employment). See
also CATHERINE T. KENNEY & KAREN R. BROWN, REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES:
THE IMPACr OF VIOLENCE ON POOR WOMEN (1996) (outlining the difficulties battered
women have securing employment due to being emotionally traumatized by the violence
and having limited child-care options).
144. See WALKER, supra note 98, at 27 (countering the myth of a battered woman as
masochistic with the "cycle of violence" and the kind qualities a batterer exhibits during
period of contrition). See also Crenshaw, supra note 143, at 893; DOBASH & DOBASH,
supra note 98, at 145-46.
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being embedded in U.S. immigration law, the provision again reaches
beyond aliens as the battered spouses of aliens may be either U.S.
citizens or aliens. Consequently, in denying a battered woman's
agency and her right to resolve her private relationship in the manner
she deems most appropriate, U.S. immigration law strikes a
devastating blow against gender equality.
As evident in VAWA's good moral character and extreme
hardship requirements as well as in the provision mandating the
deportation of domestic violence offenders, women are both treated
and expected to behave like victims. Yet such gender biases in U.S.immigration law are not limited to women living inside the U.S.
border. The good victim and all the complications she embodies
extends into the area of asylum.
C. Asylum's Good Victim
By acceding to the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and indirectly to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, the United States has made the U.N. definition of
refugee the basis for U.S. asylum and refugee law.145 Women and
young girls are reported by the United Nations High Commissioner
145. In 1967, upon acceding to the U.N. Protocol, the United States indirectly acceded
to the 1951 Convention. Since then, the Refugee Convention and its definition of
"refugee" have been codified by the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102 (codified in scattered sections of INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 and 22 U.S.C. § 2601
(1980)).
Essentially, a refugee is defined as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country
in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INA §
101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
To qualify as an asylee one must also meet the refugee definition. The terms refugee
and asylee are often used interchangeably as the only fundamental difference is that a
refugee is an individual who secures refugee status outside of the United States (such as at
a U.S. embassy), while an asylee is someone who secures refugee status only after applying
once inside the United States. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
For discussions of development of refugee definition see DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND CASE LAW 22-63 (Jon F. Weber et. al. eds, 2d. ed. 1991); Deborah Anker & Michael
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981); Kristine M. Fox, Note, Gender Persecution: Canadian Guidelines
Offer a Model for Refugee Determination n the United States, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 117,119-22 (1994); GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1996); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1966); LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 841; David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum
Adjudication On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1294-1322(1990).
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for Refugees to constitute the majority of the world's refugees.146
However, because the persecution women suffer often is not deemed
to fit into the refugee definition, women are less likely to gain asylum
than are men. 147
The case of Kasinga illustrates how gender images and biases are
at the root of this challenge facing female asylum seekers.148 In
granting asylum to Fauziya Kasinga, the BIA outlined the image a
woman must imitate in order to be successful. Its decision also
signaled the direction of more recent efforts which have further
narrowed the ability of women to seek asylum.
(1) Kasinga: Awarding Asylum to FGM Victims
(a) Kasinga's Story
At the age of 17, Fauziya Kasinga fled her country of Togo in
order to escape female genital mutilation (FGM). The ancient ritual
of FGM involves removing all or part of the female genitalia.
Following the procedure, the remaining wound may be sewn shut,
leaving only a small passage for blood or urine. While Kasinga's
Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe usually performed FGM on its younger
female members, Kasinga had been able to avoid the practice due to
her father's opposition and his influential tribal position. Yet when
Kasinga's father died and her mother was driven away according to
tribal custom, Kasinga came under the control of her paternal aunt
who supported FGM. It was the aunt's efforts to arrange Kasinga's
marriage to a man who agreed that FGM must be performed prior to
the marriage's consummation which ultimately caused Kasinga to
flee.14
9
146. UNHCR Executive Committee Report of the 36th Session, U.N. Executive Comm.,
36th Sess., para. (c), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/673 (1985), reprinted in 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
222 (1989). In another estimate, women and children account for 80% of displaced
persons. See BOuTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 1945-1996 59 (1996); Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Women's
Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform,
21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, nn. 156-58 (1996). See also, Fox, supra note 145, at 123.
147. Additionally, women are less mobile than men, thus lessening their chances of
leaving their countries of persecution. Fox, supra note 145, at 122-23.
148. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996). For an earlier discussion of how the
challenges of Kasinga and images of women have been addressed in a law school clinical
setting see Kelly, supra note 115. For a discussion of the unique evidentiary problems
faced by women seeking asylum on account of gender violence, see Nancy Kelly et al.,
Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 813, 813-24 (1994).
While the alien's name is properly spelled "Kassindja," it was misspelled throughout
legal and media accounts of her story. See infra note 149 reflecting alien's proper spelling
of name in her personal account.
149. See Kasinga, at 3-4. For Kasinga's own account of long struggle to flee Togo and
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Given the severity of FGM and the rudimentary conditions
under which it may be performed, FGM is known to cause injuries
ranging from psychological trauma to pain, hemorrhaging and
death.150 Yet despite such dangers, the practice is not one which has
been universally dismissed. Countering the typical Western attitude
of immediate repulsion, cultural relativists raise the legitimate need to
be sensitive toward the practice's sexual, cultural, religious and social
justifications. By ignoring these concerns, efforts to eradicate the
practice in the interest of empowering women risk the opposite effect
of marginalizing women by denying the voice of women who support
some aspect of the practice.151Aware of this dilemma, feminists
continue to struggle with the proper response toward FGM. This
ongoing dialogue is built upon an awareness that singular responses
toward other complex gender issues have often ignored such
important factors as race, class and immigration status.152
Despite such complications, the BIA's response to FGM in
Kasinga was swift and absolute. Reversing the Immigration Judge's
denial of asylum, the BIA determined Kasinga's risk of imminent
subjection to FGM was sufficient to establish the various prongs of
the asylum definition.153 With the concession of the INS opposing
counsel, the BIA unconditionally denounced FGM as a tool of
finally secure asylum see FAUzIYA KASSINDiA & LAYLI MILLER BASHIR, Do THEY
HEAR YOU WHEN YOU CRY (1998). For an account written by Kasinga's attorney see
Karen Musalo, In Re Kasinga: A Big Step Forward for Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 853 (1996).
150. FGM is estimated to continue to be performed in 40 countries, 28 of which are in
Africa. For further discussion of the physical aspects of the practice see Jennifer A. des
Grosseilliers, Note, In Re Kasinga: "When the Axe Came into the Forest, the Trees Said: Is
the Handle One of Us?", 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 101-07
(1998); Amede L. Obiora, The Issue of Female Circumcision: Bridges and Barricades:
Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275,284-95 (1997); Erika Sussman, Note, Contending with Culture:
An Analysis of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 193, 196-
203 (1996).
151. See Obiora, supra note 150, at 298-307.
152. For criticisms of "essential" feminist positions see, for example, DRUSCILLA
CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 6 (1995), Crenshaw, supra note 96, Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984).
I use the term "female genital mutilation" rather than less provocative terms as
"female genital surgery," "female circumcision," or the traditional term, "irua." For a
discussion of the significance of the terminology used, see Hope Lewis, Between Irua and
"Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); Obiora, supra note 150, at 289-90.
153. For the statutory definition of refugee which an asylum seeker must meet, see
supra note 145.
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persecution.5 4 As the BIA declared, "The characteristic of having
intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity
of a young woman that she should not be required to change it ....
[T]here is no legitimate reason for the practice."' 155 Indeed, in
supporting the BIA's opposition to the practice, the INS took the
unusual step of asserting that the severity of FGM eliminated any
need for the alien to prove the persecutor's punitive intent.156 After
discarding the need for punishment, establishing FGM as a tool of
persecution and finding Kasinga's fear of persecution to be "well-
founded,"' 57 the remaining hurdle to granting asylum was to find the
well-founded fear of persecution to be "on account of" one of the five
established grounds.
(b) The Gender Challenge of Asylum's Social Group
Linking persecution to an asylum seeker's race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion often proves to be the deciding factor. 58 This test uniquely
challenges women seeking asylum on account of gender violence. It
is only recently that rape has been recognized as a weapon which may
be used to punish a woman for her political opinion.159 Establishing
"on account of' when there is no readily apparent political opinion
has proven more difficult.16° The limits of that category, and the more
obvious limits of the race, religion and nationality categories has
brought feminists and advocates to turn by necessity to claiming that
gender violence is "on account of social group." Yet how is "social
group" to be defined?
Traditionally, social groups recognized in asylum law have been
154. See Kasinga, at 19-20.
155. See idL at 22-23.
156. See id. at 19-20. The need for punitive intent is one of the basic prongs of
demonstrating asylum established by Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA
1985), modified on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
157. Kasinga, at 22.
158. For the Supreme Court's most recent and illuminating discussion of the "on
account of' factor, see INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
159. In re D-V-, Int. Dec. 3252 (BIA 1993) (awarding asylum to a Haitian woman who
was raped by soldiers opposed to her support of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide).
160. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (support of feminism may
constitute "political opinion"); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987)
(upholding BIA denial of imputed political opinion asylum claim of woman related to a
murdered agrarian reform activist); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir.
1987) (granting asylum to a Salvadoran woman sexually abused by an army officer based
on political opinion imputed to her through officer's threat to publicly denounce her as a
subversive). See also Pamela Goldberg, U.S. Law and Women Asylum Seekers: Where Are
They and Where Are They Going?, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 889 (1996); Nancy Kelly,
supra note 148, at 813.
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identified through a "shared immutable characteristic" which a
person cannot or should not be required to change.161 In setting this
definition, the BIA suggested that such an "innate" characteristic as
sex could be sufficient to define a social group.162 However, "women"
per se, remain unrecognized as a social group. Women have not
simply been able to argue that gender violence is directed at women,
on account of their gender.163 Instead, it has been necessary to link
gender with another characteristic in order for a woman to advance a
successful claim based on gender violence.
Meeting this test of "gender-plus," Kasinga was built on a social
group defined as "young women" of Kasinga's tribe "who have not
been, and do not wish to be, subjected to FGM." 64 Yet by ignoring
the traditional "immutable characteristic" test and conflating social
group with political opinion conditions, the BIA heightened the
asylum standard for women. 65 There seems to be no acceptable
explanation for the BIA's failure to simply define Kasinga's social
group as "women." Kasinga had already established the prong of
"well-founded fear" by choosing to flee rather than undergo FGM.
To require her to show an opposition to the practice within the social
group criteria was unnecessary. As Judge Rosenberg reminded the
161. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985), modified on other
grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
162. The social group common characteristic "might be an innate one such as sex, color,
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership." Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec., 211,
233-34. For a discussion of how the social group standard set by Acosta may have been
curtailed, at least for women by In re R-A-, Int. Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999), see infra notes 172-
193 and accompanying text.
For earlier case-by-case determinations on the existence of non-gender related social
groups, see, for example, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990) (gay
men and lesbians in Cuba constitute social group); In re V-T-S-, Int. Dec. 3308 (BIA 1997)
(Filipinos of Chinese ancestry constitute a social group); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. 211
(finding members of taxi cooperative and persons engaged in transportation industry did
not constitute a social group); In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996) (finding individuals with
shared kinship ties made a social group); In re B-, Int. Dec. 3251 (BIA 1995) (basing
asylum in part upon applicant's persecution on account of brother's political activities).
163. See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (finding Iranian women who refuse to conform to
government's gender specific laws and social norms may constitute a social group); Safaie
v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (dismissing claim of Iranian woman based on social
group due to shared sex); Klatwitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding
harm or threat based on sexual attraction does not constitute persecution, despite fact
persecutor was a high-ranking government official able to abuse his position of power);
Matter of Pierre, 15 1. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975) (finding husband's threats and efforts to
kill his wife insufficient to award withholding of deportation). See also Goldberg, supra
note 160.
164. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, at 24 (BIA 1996).
165. See id, at 43-50 (Rosenberg, J., concurring) (criticizing majority for imposing a dual
requirement on female claims based on gender).
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Board in her concurrence, the "catch-all" social group category was
intended to have a broad scope.166 Less than two weeks earlier, the
Board had awarded asylum to a man simply based upon his
membership in a Somali tribe that was being systematically attacked
by other tribes.167 There was no imposition of any additional
requirement that the asylee demonstrate how his individual opinion
invited such wrath.168 As Judge Rosenberg candidly charged, Kasinga
was subjected to a higher standard because she was a woman. 169 The
consequence of such a distinction is to force female asylum seekers to
conform to the image of a good victim.
For Kasinga, the BIA's demand that she demonstrate an
opposition to FGM allowed her to confirm her image as an innocent
victim.170 Of course, Kasinga's youth, virginal status and sympathetic
New York Times front page story and photograph also conveniently
contributed to this image.171 However, for a woman subject to gender
violence other than the practice of FGM, satisfying the good victim
image becomes more difficult. By narrowing the social group
category available for women, the Kasinga decision successfully
restricted women from seeking asylum as a result of alternative forms
of gender violence.
(2) R-A-: Limiting Asylum for Domestic Violence Survivors
(a) R-A-'s Story
Like Kasinga, Rodi Alvarado-Pefia was a target of gender
violence.172 However, unlike Kasinga, Alvarado-Pefia was forced to
suffer another type of abuse. A native and citizen of Guatemala,
Alvarado-Pefia had fled to the United States, seeking asylum after
166. See id. at 43-44 (Rosenberg, J., concurring).
167. See In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996).
168. See Kasinga, at 45 (Rosenberg, J., concurring) (discussing In re H-).
169. See id. at 47 (Rosenberg, J., concurring).
170. Shortly after the Board's unequivocal denunciation of the practice, federal
legislation was passed criminalizing the practice of FGM and imposing sanctions on
foreign governments who were not working to prevent the practice. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Sept.
30, 1996), 22 U.S.C. § 262K-2 (Sept. 30, 1996). For more on federal and state legislation
see Sussman, supra note 150, at 194-95 nn.2-7. For more on the Board's position on FGM
see supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
171. See Celia W. Dugger, Woman's Plea for Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, April 15,1996, at Al.
172. In re R-A-, Int. Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999). While Rodi Alvarado-Pefia's name was not
revealed in the R-A- decision, newspaper and media accounts of her case disclosed her
name. See Fredric N. Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied Asylum; Immigration Ruling
Reflects Split Over Gender Persecution, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at Al; Women
Seeking Asylum in US for Domestic Abuse Find It More Difficult To Be Approved by INS,
NPR, Morning Edition, July 8,1999.
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suffering from ten years of horrific spousal abuse. From the moment
she was married at age 16, her husband mistreated her. Alvarado-
Pefia was severely raped by her husband on an almost daily basis.
Forceful sodomy caused "the most severe pain" and was also
committed on a regular basis. After being kicked in the genitalia on
one occasion, Alvarado-Pefia bled for eight days. On another
occasion, when her menstrual period was 15 days late, her husband
broke her jaw bone. She was violently kicked in the spine when she
refused to abort her three to four month fetus. Other unthinkable
acts of violence also regularly occurred. Alvarado-Pefia was kicked,
dragged and beaten "for no reason at all ... whenever he felt like
it."173 When she tried to run away she was pistol-whipped, thrashed
with an electrical cord, and threatened with defacement and bodily
mutilation by a machete. Multiple attempts to seek the protection of
the Guatemalan police and courts failed. As her husband had told
her, "You're my woman, you do what I say."174  Through this
declaration of power, Alvarado-Pefia testified her husband saw her
"as something that belonged to him and he could do anything he
wanted."175
In response to this record, the Board declared it was a "struggle
to describe how deplorable we find the husband's conduct to have
been."'1 76 Yet such a finding did not prevent the Board from denying
Alvarado-Pefia's claim, determining that her abuse was unrelated to
any legitimate social group.177
(b) Restricting Social Group for Gender Violence
Granting her case at trial, the Immigration Judge accepted
Alvarado-Pefia's social group as "Guatemalan women who have been
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male domination.' ' 78 The BIA
conceded that this group contained the prerequisite "immutable
characteristic.' 1 79 However, despite years of adhering to this basic
formulation for social group, the BIA announced that additional
showings must now be made. To fall into the social group category,
173. R-A-, at 19.
174. 1d at 5.
175. Idi at 7.
176. I& at 8.
177. An argument for asylum based on an actual or imputed political opinion that she
wished to be free from harm or did not believe women should be controlled by men was
also denied. See id at 19-27. For the difficulties women have traditionally had construing
gender violence as persecution on account of political opinion, see supra notes 158-163
and accompanying text.
178. R-A-, at 27.
179. Id at28.
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Alvarado-Pefia had to demonstrate how the social group
characteristic was understood by the alien's society so that the BIA
could understand the persecutor's motives.180 To qualify as a member
of a social group, the battered woman would also be required to show
a social expectation that women be abused or that "adverse
consequences" result when they are not abused.' 8 ' Alvarado-Pefia's
claim failed as she had not shown "that the victims of spouse abuse
view themselves as members of this group, nor, most importantly,
that their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of
this group."' 82 Moreover, the appellant failed to demonstrate the
nexus between her purported social group and the abuse since only
her husband abused her. For the Board, social group membership for
victims of domestic violence implied that a persecutor would target
other members of the group besides his wife.183
While the Kasinga decision had been hailed as a "big step
forward" for women seeking asylum, it was ultimately the "gender-
plus" definition of social group created in Kasinga which allowed the
Board to justify creating such an insurmountable test for battered
women seeking asylum.184  Minimizing the claim in R-A- in
comparison to Kasinga, the Board held:
The respondent in this case has not demonstrated that domestic
violence is as pervasive in Guatemala as FGM is among the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, or, more importantly, that domestic
violence is a practice encouraged and viewed as societally
important in Guatemala. She has not shown that women are
expected to undergo abuse from their husbands, or that husbands
who do not abuse their wives, or the nonabused wives themselves,
face social ostracization or other threats to make them conform to a
societal expectation of abuse. 185
By contorting a disparate definition of social group for women,
the Board effectively limited the number of gender violence cases
which would be eligible for asylum. In so doing, the Board neatly
addressed several concerns. First, by creating a difficult test for
battered women, the BIA pacified any fear that simply demonstrating
the "immutable characteristic" of social group would encourage large
numbers of battered women to pass through our "golden door."'1 6
180. See id. at 27-28. The BIA also found that the appellant failed the less expansive
test imposed by the 9th Circuit of demonstrating "a voluntary associational relationship."
Matter of R-A-, at 27 (relying on Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), Li
v. INS, 92 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1996); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1990)).
181. R-A-, at 30.
182. Id. at 29-30.
183. Id. at 33-34.
184. Musalo, supra note 149.
185. R-A-, at 43-44.
186. "But the social group concept would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition
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Indeed, one week after R-A- was denied, the Board was able to deny
asylum to a young girl seeking protection from the abuse of her
father.187 Unlike such pervasive forms of gender violence, FGM is a
relatively limited practice, generating fewer cases than would
conceivably come forward if asylum was awarded based upon the
type of spousal abuse suffered in R-A-.18s Yet, more than just playing
a numbers game, denying asylum in R-A- preserved societal norms.
In contrast to its attitude toward FGM, the U.S. is not socially or
legally prepared to so vehemently denounce gender violence when it
takes its more common (and Western) form of domestic violence.189
The underlying cultural belief that such crimes are private actions is
as prevalent in asylum law as it is in U.S. domestic law.190
if common characteristics, coupled with a meaningful level of harm, were all that need be
shown." Id at 31.
187. Such abuse was often a result of the girl's efforts to intervene when her father was
beating her mother. As the case is an unpublished decision, only newspaper accounts are
available. See Tulsky, supra note 172, at A3. For later criticisms of the inconsistency in
asylum law regarding domestic violence, see Advocates Point to Inconsistency in
Adjudication of Domestic Violence Cases, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 205 (2000).
188. For the BIA's recognition that the number of potential asylees does not affect a
legal interpretation of the standard, see In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276,11, n.5 (BIA 1996).
189. See, e.g., Reva B. Seigel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2180 (1996) (arguing that domestic violence has undergone
"preservation through transformation"). See also Honorable Karen Burnstein, Naming
the Violence: Destroying the Myth, 58 ALB. L. REv. 961, 964-65 (1995) (arguing that the
failure to recognize domestic violence as a public issue may serve to condone it);
Mahoney, supra note 6, at 12-13 (arguing that support for privacy may explain efforts to
protect the institution of marriage and the practice of subordinating women).
190. As stated by the majority, despite a record revealing the Guatemalan
government's "tolerance of abuse at levels we find appalling... construing private acts of
violence to be qualifying governmental persecution, by virtue of the inadequacy of
protection, would obviate, perhaps entirely, the 'on account of' requirement in the
statute." R-A-, at 38, 40. Relying on the Department of Justice's (DOJ) own guidelines
for granting asylum to battered wives, the dissent charged: "This type of differentiation
between the supposedly more private forms of persecution, typically suffered by women,
and the more public forms of persecution, typically suffered by men, is exactly the type of
outdated and improper distinction that the DOJ Guidelines were intended to overcome."
Id. at 87-88 (Guendelsberger, J., dissenting). For more on the DOJ guidelines and their
basis in UNHCR instructions, see Phyllis Coven, Department of Justice, Memorandum on
Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women (May 26,
1995). See also Nancy Kelly, supra note 148.
For more on the treatment of spousal abuse and rape as private acts in asylum law,
see, for example, Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanded)
(characterizing intimate abuse as done for the abuser's "personal edification"); Matter of
Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975) (denying asylum to wife of high ranking Haitian
police officer). See also Kelly, supra note 115 (discussing the challenged posed by the
private/public dichotomy in a law school clinic and advocacy setting).
Outside of immigration law, the public/private distinction and its encouragement of
governmental inaction has been widely acknowledged by feminists as a tool utilized over
such diverse issues as abortion, sexual harassment, rape and spousal abuse to "fortify
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To liberally award asylum based on domestic violence would
necessitate recognizing that gender violence in any form is a tool
wielded to subordinate women. In deciding R-A-, the Board
evidenced its failure to understand that domestic violence is about
"doing power" within the confines of a relationship.191 At the core of
the Board's ignorance was its demands that a survivor of domestic
violence prove: 1) she was abused by men other than her husband; 2)
her husband abused other women besides his wife; 3) the violence
was motivated by something more than her husband's belief that
"You're my woman, you do what I say."'192
Common to a most basic understanding of domestic violence, a
primer on the subject begins by recognizing that: "The use of
physical violence against women in their position as wives is not the
only means by which they are controlled and oppressed but it is one
of the most brutal and explicit expressions of patriarchical
domination.' 1 93  The Board's inability to appreciate this most
fundamental notion once again reminds us of the gender stereotypes,
biases and prejudices underlying immigration law. The effect of such
images is to destroy the potential of asylum and the strength of other
forms of relief available through U.S. immigration law.
Conclusion
Combined, the laws governing rights of citizenship, residency and
asylum all demonstrate consistent attitudes toward gender and
desirable gender roles. Mothers remain natural caretakers and are
provided with inherent rights to confer citizenship and petition for the
residency of their children. Such imagery contrasts sharply with that
of the father who is understood to have no natural caregiving ability
and retains only a financial obligation. As a result, immigration law
mandates that fathers meet such obligations before they may exercise
the right to their children. Images of feminine goodness also manifest
themselves through the demand for virtuous, helpless victims in the
private relationships of power." MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 97. For a discussion of
the dichotomy's impact on the treatment of domestic violence, see, for example, Elizabeth
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); Malinda L. Seymore,
Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1032, 1070-73 (1996) (analyzing how the spousal immunity doctrine has
affected the public/private debate in the domestic violence context); Siegel, supra note 189
(discussing the "modernization" of domestic violence as a right of marital privacy).
For a discussion of rape's portrayal as a private sexual act see Iglesias, supra note 6, at
891-97; MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 87-88.
191. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 93 (quoting JAN E. STETS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CONTROL 109 (1988)).
192. In re R-A-, Int. Dec. 3403, at 5, 35-36 (BIA 1999).
193. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 98, at ix.
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laws governing VAWA, gender-based asylum and the deportation of
domestic violence offenders.
Faced with such images and the realization of their societal
prevalence, it seems futile to hope that immigration law can
effectively change upon legal challenge. Invoking such guarantees as
the right to equal protection will not prove successful. In other
contexts, institutional biases toward gender traditionally have not
been removed despite the apparent availability of legal remedies.
Earlier legal contests in the immigration context confirm the limits of
judicial and legislative appeals. For citizens, such as the parents and
children in Miller, that Court's declared position against gender
stereotyping did not prevent it from accepting that citizen fathers'
could be disparately treated. With Fiallo as a stark reminder, it is
clear that the plenary power doctrine makes reliance on equal
protection in the immigration sphere even more tenuous. Legislative
amendments following the failure of Fiallo evidence that political
solutions are also not immune to gender biases. Other distinctions,
such as those confronting women in their quest for residency and
asylum and men facing deportation for domestic violence will also
predictably not be remedied by legal appeals. In the final analysis,
negative images of gender roles will only be eliminated in
immigration law as in other areas of law when society is prepared to
change.
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